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Who am I? What is the self and where does it come from? This may be one of
the oldest problems in philosophy. Beyond traditional philosophy, only very recently
approaches from neuroscience (in particular imaging studies) have tried to address
these questions, too. So what are neural substrates of our self? An increasing body of
evidence has demonstrated that a set of structures labeled as cortical midline structures
are fundamental components to generate a conscious self. Moreover, recent theories
on embodied cognition propose that this conscious self might be supplemented by
additional structures, for example, in the somatosensory cortices, which enable our
brain to create an “embodied mind”. While the self based on cortical midline structures
may be related to a conscious self, we here propose that the embodied facet of the
self may be linked to something we call unconscious self. In this article we describe
problems of this model of a conscious and unconscious self and discuss possible
solutions from a theoretical point of view.
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WHO AM I?
We know that even in prehistoric times humans tried to open the skulls of their sick conspecifics.
Moreover, prehistoric men used human skulls, usually those of ancestors, for religious worship
long after death. Thus, the head always seemed to be an object of interest for us. Perhaps the
prehistoric men assumed that something inside our skull may be related to our feelings, thoughts
and memories. But we had to wait until the French philosopher René Descartes, who was the first
one who made the distinction between mind and body very explicit. His famous philosophical
statement ‘‘Cogito ergo sum’’ can be translated as ‘‘I think, therefore I am’’. Hence, he concludes
that he can be certain that he exists because he thinks. For many researchers these thoughts mark
the beginning of modern western philosophy. Descartes statement raised a lot of questions, in
particular about the relationship between body and mind, which are still a matter of discussion
today.
This is in particular true since modern neuroscience started to unravel the mystery of the brain.
New imaging tools such as fMRI enable us to look at our brain while it is working. These new
approaches have opened the door to answer the questions Descartes posed about the relationship
between mind and body in a way he never would have imagined.
In this article we suggest the idea that the processing of self-referential stimuli in cortical midline
structures may represent an important part of the conscious self, which may be supplemented by an
unconscious part of the self that has been called an ‘‘embodied mind’’ (Varela et al., 1991), which
relies on other brain structures.
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THE CONSCIOUS SELF: CORTICAL
MIDLINE STRUCTURES
Since the famous words by René Descartes there were numerous
attempts to clarify what he described as a self. Descartes suggested
that the self is a substance, such as a thing, which can be
confronted with the body. But if so, how and where do these
two substances interact? Remarkably, Descartes suggested a place
where this interaction should take place: the epiphysis cerebri.
Descartes believed this region to be the principal seat of the
soul. In contrast, the Scottish philosopher David Hume argued
that there is no self as a mental entity; there is only a complex
set of perceptions of interrelated events that reflect the world.
Hence, there are only events that we perceive. In this view, the
self is merely an illusion. Similar, the contemporary German
philosopher Thomas Metzinger argues that there is no self as a
mental entity (Metzinger, 2003).
More recently, this problem has also been discussed in
neuroscience. In order to examine the self in a neuroscientific
way, studies focused on different features of the self. Central
features of the self may include feelings of agency, ownership
feelings for the body, autobiographical memory, experiencing
the self as a unit, or labeling of stimuli as self-referential.
Depending on the feature of the self that has been examined,
the neuroscientific approach varied. For example, research on
the last facet focused on self-referential relative to non-self-
referential tasks. In a typical experimental paradigm Kelley
et al. (2002) asked participants to judge trait adjectives (e.g.,
aggressive or friendly) as to whether they properly described
themselves, a given case, or the current US president. Thereby,
stimuli were categorized as self-relevant, other-referential, or case
referential. Brain regions associated with self-relevant stimuli are
then interpreted as describing the neural signature of our self
(Kelley et al., 2002).
In spite of these different approaches, an increasing body of
evidence consistently identified regions located in the midline
of the human cerebral cortex, which have been labeled as
cortical midlines structures (CMS), to be crucial for self-specific
processing (Northoff, 2004, 2011, 2013, 2016). It has been
suggested that those structures are central for self-relevant
or self-related processing, thus enabling us to link internal
with external stimuli (Northoff, 2016). Self-related processing
describes the processing of a stimulus in relation to (but not
representing it in) the self.
What are the structures of the CMS and how are they related
to the self? The CMS structures include several phylogenetic
old brain structures. They subserve different functions for
establishing a self. For example, the orbitomedial prefrontal
cortex (OMPFC) has been linked to a continuous representation
of self-referential stimuli. The supragenual anterior cingulate
cortex (SAC) seems to monitor these self-referential stimuli,
while the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) may evaluate
them with respect to the relevance for the self. For example,
the DMPFC and the SAC were involved when participants
were asked to monitor and judge whether auditory verbal
feedback was their own or another person’s voice (McGuire
et al., 1996). The posterior-cingulate cortex (PC) may then
be important to integrate these stimuli into the emotional
and autobiographical framework of the person (Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff, 2016).
The CMS can be understood as an anatomical unit because
these regions maintain strong and reciprocal projections among
each other. In addition, they demonstrate a similar pattern of
connectivity to brain regions outside the CMS, e.g., to the ventro-
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex or the limbic system including
hippocampus, amygdala and insula.
It is intriguing that this network of CMS overlaps with another
network, the resting state or default mode network (DMN). This
DMN describes interacting brain regions and is most commonly
active when a person is not focused on the outside and the
brain is at wakeful rest. The DMN is involved during passive
rest, mind wandering, remembering the past and planning the
future, and also when thinking about others. Among others, the
DMN includes brain regions such as themedial prefrontal cortex,
the angular gyrus and structures of the hippocampal formation
(Huang et al., 2016).
So what kind of self do the CMS represent? Existing studies
investigated the relationship between the CMS and the self
predominantly with the focus on the ability to think about
oneself. This is also supported by the link to the resting state
activity network. Since one cannot think about oneself without
being conscious, we here describe the CMS as representing in
particular an important part of the conscious self. This conscious
self represents a stable self over time, allowing us, for example, to
travel through time (remembering the past and projecting into
the future).
THE UNCONSCIOUS SELF: EMBODIMENT
In the previous section we argued that a set of brain structures
labeled as CMS is an important part of a conscious self. We
here suggest that there are also unconscious parts of the self. The
distinction between conscious and unconscious self is important
because it points to the observation that our self is not limited
to the stream-of-consciousness but includes also other features.
These other features may include, for example, unconscious parts
of the self. The concept between conscious and unconscious parts
of the self is famous at least until the work of Freud. However,
we here call processes as unconscious when thinking about the
self usually does not tell us anything about these processes. In
this sense, unconscious processes are automatic. We assume
that there are numerous processes in our mind that can be
described as unconscious. In this article we focus on a particular
line of research, because studies based on this approach suggest
convergent anatomical substrates underlying these unconscious
facets of the self. Thus, we propose that embodied cognitionsmay
represent important aspects of the unconscious self.
What is embodiment? There are different theories of
embodiment and definitions. Embodiment in the most general
form argues that human mental functions are shaped by the
way the human body interacts with the world (Wilson, 2002).
Mind, body and environment influence one another in order to
promote adaptive success (Thompson and Varela, 2001; Wilson,
2002; Gallagher, 2005; Barsalou, 2008). In this sense, the body
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is an interface between the mind and the world, it merges our
thoughts with the space around us (Varela et al., 1991). Gallagher
points out that embodiment works preceding to any knowledge,
it is not accessible to our consciousness. Therefore, Gallagher
concludes that the body shapes the mind at a fundamental basic
level, while it remains behind the scene (Gallagher, 2005).
What are neural substrates of this embodiment? Research
on the conceptual or embodied metaphor theory (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1999; Williams et al., 2009; Lakoff, 2014) provides
suggestions about the neural underpinnings of embodied
cognitions. Conceptual metaphors are different from linguistic
metaphors. While linguistic metaphors are obviously present
in language, conceptual metaphors mean understanding and
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another (Lakoff
and Johnson, 1980). Numerous studies demonstrate how those
embodied metaphors build a scaffold and guide our everyday
behavior in an unconscious way (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). An
example is the moral purity metaphor, which binds moral purity
and physical cleanliness (Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006). Studies
on this metaphor have demonstrated that hand washing make
us judge subsequent scenarios describing moral transgressions as
less severe (Schnall et al., 2008). Hence, abstract thoughts about
morality can be unconsciously grounded in sensory experiences.
What are neural substrates related to these conceptual metaphor
effects? Several studies determined primary motor and especially
primary somatosensory cortices as crucial neural underpinnings
of the embodied cognitions (Lacey et al., 2012; Schaefer et al.,
2014). For example, it has been demonstrated that the moral-
purity metaphor is related to sensory brain areas (Schaefer
et al., 2015; Denke et al., 2016). This is also in line with recent
theories on embodied simulation processes. Simulation here
means that the retrieval of conceptual meaning involves a partial
re-enactment of sensory and motor experiences (Gallese and
Lakoff, 2005). The above-mentioned imaging studies provide
support for this assumption.
But how can primary somatosensory areas be linked to
embodied metaphors? In the traditional view those brain
areas are known to represent primary modalities. Thus, the
classic understanding of the primary somatosensory cortex
is to reflect touch on the body surface in a more or less
mechanical way (Kaas, 2008). However, recent findings in
neuroscience draw the attention to more complex functions
of the primary somatosensory cortex, pointing to a role for
the somatosensory cortices in perceiving rather than reflecting
touch on the body surface. Moreover, these brain areas
seem to include even social perceptions such as empathy
(Keysers et al., 2010; Schaefer et al., 2012). In his neural
reuse theory, Anderson argues that brain areas may be
involved in different neural partnerships depending on tasks
and circumstances (Anderson, 2014). According to Anderson,
‘‘neural reuse’’ refers to a form of neuroplasticity, in which
neural elements originally developed for one purpose are put
to multiple uses. Embodied metaphors are examples of how
our brain uses old strategies in new ways. Hence, higher-
order cognitive processes such as moral thinking may be just
recombinations of more simple and basic unconscious brain
processes.
The brain areas representing the embodied self (in particular
the sensorimotor brain areas) are different from the ones we have
mentioned to be engaged in the CMS. We suggest that, while
the CMS represent a conscious self, brain structures engaged in
embodied cognitions might be related to an unconscious self. At
least part of this unconscious self may be based on sensorimotor
brain areas. We further assume that both parts of the self are
consistently interacting.
But aren’t we often conscious about sensorimotor activation?
And doesn’t this speak against a role of the sensorimotor
brain areas for unconscious parts of the self? In fact, we are
frequently aware of sensorimotor activation. However, often this
activation is also automatic and unconscious. Again, we argue
with Anderson that brain areas can have multiple roles. Based
on the theory of embodied cognitions we assume that many
conceptual metaphors (e.g., cleanliness and moral purity) were
once learned consciously and now represent an unconscious link
in our self (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).
HOW DOES THE CONSCIOUS SELF
INTERACT WITH THE BODY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT?
The suggestion of a conscious self and an embodied self as an
unconscious self that provides a link to our body experiences
raises a number of problems. We will here discuss only one
major point, which refers to the way the conscious self may be
related to the embodied self. In contrast to Descartes’ suggestion,
previous work has described this self as a brain based structure
and organization, rather than a mental or physical entity located
somewhere in the brain (Northoff, 2013). This conscious self as
a structure or organization is related to both the body and the
social world.
How can we imagine these relationships? When we describe
the self as structure and organization we understand it as a
system. But the concept of the embodied self states that the
self or cognition is not an activity of the mind alone, but is
distributed across the entire situation including mind, body,
environment (e.g., Beer, 1995), thereby pointing to an embodied
and situated self. How can a system include also its environment?
According to the British philosopher and mathematician Georg
Spencer-Brown a system is defined by its border, which not only
separates the system from the environment, but also is the way a
system is defined in the very first beginning: draw a distinction
and a universe comes into being (Spencer-Brown, 1969).
Wilson suggests that the embodied self is an open system.
Thus, the boundaries of a system are partly a matter of judgment
and depend on the particular purposes of one’s analysis (Wilson,
2002). But we still need to ask what determines the border
in those cases. Recent general system theory here provides an
interesting view. Systems such as the consciousness have been
described as functionally closed, which means they are systems
that are separated from other systems and their environment
by the specific way they operate (Luhmann, 1985, 1988, 1995).
In this view, our consciousness is a closed system, which is
built out of thoughts and nothing else. We can imagine this
system as a self-referential system, in which every thought is
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followed by another thought, which is again followed by the
next thought and so on. This is also called an ‘‘autopoietic’’
system (Luhmann, 1995). In this way, the self is a closed system,
because both the situation as well as the body belong to the
environment for this system (Luhmann, 1995). However, this
system is only closed in the way it works, but it is open for
incoming information from the social situation or from the body,
e.g., responses from another individual or information that the
body feels warmth. Interestingly, the self as an autopoietic system
cannot be directly steered, it can only be perturbed. Thus, the
self-referential circle is still closed, but can be ‘‘touched’’ or
disturbed by information from the environment (e.g., feelings of
warmth or friendly responses by a conspecific). The system itself
then needs to make sense out of this ‘‘disturbance’’, interpreting
it in this or another way.
In this way, the conscious self may be both at the same
time, open and closed. We further suggest that the unconscious
self, which we described (at least partly) as the embodied self,
represent one way the environment (e.g., the social world via
the own body) may affect (disturb, perturbate) the conscious
self. Therefore, given that at least parts of the unconscious self
might be embodied, the mind also needs to be understood in the
context of its relationship to a physical body that interacts with
the world.
However, it remains unclear which neural structures carry this
interaction of the conscious with the unconscious self. Future
work is needed to supplement this conceptual relationship with
neural substrates.
Furthermore, we argue that through embodiment the self is
also embedded in the environment. This means that our self
is not isolated but intrinsically social. The social dimension of
the self has been discussed by numerous philosophers, often
addressed as the question for intersubjectivity.
Hence, the self should not be understood as an entity located
somewhere in the brain, isolated from both the body and the
environment. In contrast, the self can be seen as a brain-
based neurosocial structure and organization, always linked to
the environment (or the social sphere) via embodiment and
embeddedness. We further argue that embeddedness is first and
embodiment may show up in a later developmental stage. The
structure and organization that may define our self develops
through childhood and adolescence. While the self is embedded
in the environment from the very first beginning, embodiment
may show up later in this progress. Furthermore, considering
that there is no self without environment, we argue that the
environment created the self.
Thus, we conclude that the self is part of a broader
environmental system, including body and social dimensions.
The brain’s cortical midline structures activity seem to be a neural
predisposition for this constitution, which is at the same time
dependent on the environmental context.
WHO WE ARE: THE CONSCIOUS AND THE
UNCONSCIOUS SELF
Who am I? Since human evolution once reached the state of an
elaborated conscious self, we questioned ourselves these kinds of
philosophical questions. And since at least the work of Sigmund
Freud it is well known that the self includes also areas beyond our
consciousness.
In this article we made the suggestion that the conscious
self can be related to a network of brain areas that has been
labeled as CMS. Moreover, we aimed to show that there are
additional unconscious parts of the self; at least parts of them we
here called embodied self, which may be based in particular on
sensorimotor brain regions. Furthermore, we tried to describe
the interaction between both systems by suggesting that the
conscious self is a functionally closed (or autopoietic) system that
can be disturbed by the unconscious embodied self. We are aware
that these are very preliminary considerations. Furthermore, we
again stress that the embodied self may represent only parts
of the unconscious self. However, we believe that both future
neuroscience unraveling as well as philosophical or theoretical
advancements may further help us in the understanding of
the self, one of the most peculiar achievements of the human
evolution.
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